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Autor Thema: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917  (Gelesen 4034 mal)

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Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #15 am: 25 Januar 2017, 15:06:22 »
Okay Bernd. Du bist Beck.Schulte. Wusste ich jetzt nicht,  lese zu selten mit. Hier meine 5 Cents zu der Schlacht. Ist nicht von Wikipedia, sondern von mir.

THE LEAST KNOWN NAVAL BATTLEOF WW 1: OFF BERGEN, DEC 12th 1917


On December 11th, in basically repeating a raid done by the cruisers SMS BRUMMER and SMS BREMSE two months before, the 2nd torpedoboat flotilla, comprising of a cruiser and the most modern, largest and best equipped destroyers of the imperial German high seas fleet set out to damage merchant traffic between England and Norway. They would come up with destroying a whole convoy, like 2 months before, and escape unscathed.
This battle, almost unknown, marked among others the end of sea warfare of the so called “Victorian Age”. In tactics it underlined the turn to hit-and-run from line-of-battle tactics. And it was a virtual repeat of the battle off Lerwick and would be continued with a raid on the Flanders mine barrage.

WHAT HAPPENED BEFORE AND THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF THE GERMANS
The problem for the Germans was, that their strategic plan on sea warfare before WW I would not work in this conflict. For Admiral Tirpitz´ plan of the high risk fleet only could have worked, if the English would have had blockaded the Germans near to the German coastline. The foe instead decided to implement a distant blockade with Scapa Flow on the Orkneys at main base. When the Germans had in theory a good chance to inflict heavy damage to the Grand Fleet because the ratio of battleships still was reasonable in 1914-15, they didn t do so by incompetent command and orders of Kaiser Wilhelm not to risk the heavy units. With dashing Admiral Reinhard Scheer the Germans in 1916 got a new strategy. He wanted to draw out portions of the Grand Fleet and beat them piecemeal. He tried, but was compromised by intelligence of the British forces, and despite inflicting heavy damage at Jutland on 31st May 1916, barely escaped with his fleet. After this he didn t recommend other sorties like this. And they hardly happened again. The Germans mainly used their battleships now to guard the mine barrages in the German bight and to guard and support landing operations in the Baltic. Strategy changed to the u-boat war in order to bring the United Kingdom to starvation and capitulation.
While fielding hundreds of submarines the German imperial fleet still had several 10,000 sailors on board of its surface fleet, literally doing nothing other than (partially) fighting in the Baltic operations. Only at Flanders in the English Channel the surface navy was quite active, fielding a force of small destroyers and even smaller torpedo boats to harass shipping and to lay mine fields.
The Germans, thinking about using their assets comprising of very fast and well armed light cruisers as well as of the 2nd torpedo boat flotilla, which assembled the largest, most well armed and fastest destroyers of the Kaiserreich, developed the strategy of task groups to use in hit and run tactics in order to support the effort of the submarine service. They did so in learning by the Royal Navy, who practiced the hit and run as early as 1st Heligoland in late 1914.
Before rearming these rather small vessels the Germans had to go through a learning process. German warships always had been undergunned. Battleships had only 9.4 inch QF guns and later 11 inch QF guns. It took a lot of time to then turn to 12 inch QF guns only to be followed 15 inch QF guns in the High seas fleets last two battleships in 1916. Light cruisers were limited to 4.1 inch guns for a long time and the “Torpedoboote”, the German destroyers, to 16 pounder (88 mm) QF guns. This was done a long time, because –against the experts-   the “Front” (the service) demanded guns to fire as quick as possible and easy to handle loading procedures. For the torpedoboats the service saw the main weapon in the torpedo tubes. They were told better. Only in 1915 the lesson was learned by the loss of several small cruisers and torpedoboat “destroyers” by lack of firepower. Then the armament of coming and still existing units worth it was subsequently upgraded.

GERMAN STRATEGY
By the 2nd half of 1917 the U-boat offensive was in decline. German high command decided, that it was time to support the U-boat fleet and to divert the defense of ships/convoys by the  Allies. Among several operations the battle off Lerwick (Shetlands) in October 1917 with SMSS BRUMMER and BREMSE against a convoy and its covering force proved to be a full success. With the raid of 11th December 1917 the High seas fleet wanted to repeat this success.
Mid of November the commander of the 2nd torpedo boat flotilla, Commodore Heinrich, strongly emphasized a push by destroyers without cruiser protection into the northern north sea, in the time between 10th and 18th December with wind under wind force 5/6 and temperatures over minus 3 degrees Celsius. The Germans had found out, that the British did not have altered their protection for the sea traffic along the eastern coast and on the Shetland/Bergen convoy trail, after the strong beating, that they had received in October by SMS BRUMMER and SMS BREMSE. The Germans opted for this surface fleet action instead of preparing cruisers and sending out tankers for Atlantic operations. All of this was thought over, but would only happen in world war II.
The English on the other hand had examined the possibility to reinforce the convoy protection. But since there were convoys nearly every day to Bergen and back, the Grand fleet saw itself in no position to help due to a chronical shortage of destroyers. The opportunity to take away destroyers out of the Mediterranean to put them into escort service was denied by the admiralty. The idea to reduce the number of convoys in order to enlarge not only them but their protection force as well, was rejected.
This was the situation, when the commander of the Imperial High Seas fleet, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, in end of November 1917 gave order to undertake a raid, which should be done against the English east coast and the Shetland/Bergen convoy road simultaneously after December 10th .
 The only units to do so were the Zerstoerer of the 2nd torpedo boat flotilla, These large boats were strong enough, could hit hard and had a large endurance at high speed.

THE GERMAN FORCE
The 2nd Torpedo boat flotilla set out with a modern light cruiser, SMS Emden (II) and 8 state-of-the-art torpedo boat destroyers. In fact, the German destroyers of 2nd flotilla were the only ones the Germans themselves would name destroyers (“Zerstörer”) instead of “Torpedoboote”.
The flagship of the raiding force, SMS EMDEN (II), was a modern light cruiser, who was only completed in December 1916. Displacing well over 6,000 tons at 146 m length, being well armored and having a main battery of 7 x 5.9 inch (149 mm) QF guns, this ship, which was capable of 29 knots in deep water, did not take part in the actual operations on 11th and 12th December 1917. It instead remained as a tactical reserve in the background.
The 3rd half flotilla, which is in the focus of this essay, was made out of 4 large destroyers. Three of these, SMS G 101, SMS G103 and SMS G 104 were under construction at the Germania Werft for Argentina and seized after the breakout of the war by Germany in 1914. Being originally armed with 4x 16 pounder “pea shooters”, they were rearmed in summer 1916 with 4 x 10,5 cm (4.1 inch) QF  TK or UTOF l /45 guns, formidable ordnance and much better than the guns, who were on the German cruisers, that sank in combat in 1914. They were lean ships of 95 meters in length, with a mean displacement of around 1,400 tons and a complement of about a hundred. They featured a short and high forecastle, two masts, three smokestacks and had two twin torpedo tube sets as main armament.
The other destroyer in the half flotilla, SMS V 100, built at Vulcan in Stettin, was even larger. Using a turbine set originally ordered by the Imperial Russian navy, the ship was 99 meters in length, displacing a mean 1,600 tons, able to go over 36 knots with 40,000 hp. 115 men served in her and beside the 4 x 10,5 cm l/ 45 QF she fielded 6 torpedo tubes.


BRITISH PLANS
The Royal Navy had a convoy system get  running again, when losses of merchant ships went appalling in the u-boat war. Convoys reduced the number of undefended ships to be sunk by u-boats to near nil, while facing the u-boats with hard fight when attacking. Plus it  got enormously difficult for u-boats to find targets.
The British had a convoy schedule on the run with one convoy forth and back to Bergen every day. Even though BRUMMER and BREMSE had annihilated a whole convoy and its protection in October, the British obviously didn t believe in this happening again. They also had great trust in the formidable distant covering force, which was a big fault.

BRITISH FORCES
The escort group of the convoy, which would be attacked, was exceptionally strong, comprising of 2 destroyers and 4  armed trawlers to keep the German submarines away from 6 merchant men this was quite a capable force. In the distance the British had a covering force, made out of the armored cruisers HMSS SHANNON and MINOTAUR and 4 destroyers.
SHANNON and MINOTAUR, each displacing about 16,000 tons and being heavily armored and armed with a mixture of 9.2 inch and 7.6 inch QF guns, were only capable of about 22 knots at best. Obviously this was not fast enough a speed to catch modern destroyers, able of speeds over 30 knots. Even the German destroyer SMS G 104, which had boiler problems in the battle, still managed a speed of 25 knots.
HMS PARTRIDGE and HMS PELLEW, who actually protected the convoy to Bergen, were both M-class destroyers. They were quite new by the time of the battle. Partridge was launched at Swan Hunter on March 4th 1916, Pellew at Beardmore on May 8th the same year. The displacement of these ships was around 1,000 tons, with a length of 83 meters. They had a high forecastle, one mast and 3 smokestacks and were armed with 3x 4 inch (102 mm)  QF guns behind splinter shields, a 2 pounder (40 mm) “pom-pom” and two sets of two 21 inch torpedo tubes each.
The 4 armed trawlers HMT COMMANDER FULLERTON, HMT LIVINGSTONE, HMT TOKIO and HMT LORD ALVERSTONE were all around 200 to 300 tons of displacement and fitted with a 12 pounder (7,6 cm) QF gun on the forecastle.
The convoy was made out of 6 steamers.

ACTION

The Germans left harbour in the very morning of December the 11th, 1917, at 03.45 am. At 4 o clock in the afternoon the group had reached a position on the very northeast of the Doggerbank and then splitted.
SMS EMDEN would remain as a tactical reserve on the Doggerbank in mid North Sea. One group of 4 destroyers would sweep the English east coast to sink merchant traffic and the other one was set about to intercept a Shetland/Bergen convoy.
At 10 o clock in the night of December the 11th  there was bad weather for the 3rd half-flotilla, and its commander, Kapitänleutnant Hans Kolbe, was about to cease the operation. But at 7 o clock in the morning of the other day the sea was calming down, so that the squadron, comprising of G 101, G103, G104 and V100, went north again, above the convoy trail. But after a little while the sea was so wild, that only 9 sea miles per hour were possible. At about 11 a.m. the half flotilla went again to the south. The plan now was to sail outside of the sight of land slowly to again get in with the dusk in order to catch up with an enemy convoy.
The speed of the group was put down by SMS G 104 (Kapitänleutnant von Varendorff), which had problems with the starboard condenser and only was able to steam at 25 knots since 8.40 a.m. At about 12.30 on December 12th the half flotilla was on a southern course about 50 sea miles out of the Norwegian coast. Sea was high and visibility not very good. At this moment the convoy incoming to Bergen came into sight. The British were not sure, what warships were coming towards them, friend or foe. The half flotilla immediately went toward the enemy. They were lucky in the fact, that PARTRIDGE´s signal lamp failed to work for ten minutes. By the time the British knew, distance was down to about 7,000 meters. The German commander, Kolbe, now decided to attack the British destroyers with G 101 (Kplt. Mayrhofer), G 103 (Kplt. Metger) and V 100 (Kplt. Lindau), while von Varendorff was ordered to sink the merchant ships, since he was hampered with the speed.
Meanwhile the two british destroyers had made themselves battle ready, ordered the ships in the convoy to disperse and otherwise had the will to defend this ships as best as they could, in the best tradition of the Royal Navy. Shortly before fire was opened, HMS PARTRIDGE transferred a radio message, which could not be jammed by the Germans, saying that the covering force of the convoy is in combat with an enemy unknown in number and force. This was received by the SHANNON-MINOTAUR group some 50 miles distant.
The German destroyers bypassed the convoy with the 6 merchant men and 4 armed trawlers, firing on them while overtaking them and then shifted fire at 13.05 on the British destroyers, when the distance was down to 5,000 meters. G 101 fired on PELLEW, while V 100 and G 103 aimed at PARTRIDGE. The British destroyers had in harsh weather a very unvourable lee position. Their gun crews were, now that ships were running with high speed, hampered by overcoming water. Of the German ships at times nothing could be spotted but masts and funnels by the British force and therefore the British could not obtain hits with their fire. The Germans tried to reduce the distance, but the British ships countered that by turning away.
“The Germans made a miraculous use of their advantage in position, and as always, their fire was enormously accurate and quick.” Despite the fact, that the German fire meant death to those, who whitnessed it, officers and men on the British destroyers followed the impact of the German salvoes with grim respect. 10 minutes, after the Germans had opened fire, HMS PARTRIDGE lost speed, when she suffered from a heavy hit, that destroyed the main steam pipe and with this the propulsion. The machine room was filled with hot steam and was inoperable. Many good men died there and it proved to be impossible for the leading engineer, to get into the room and repair it. A few minutes later the aft 4 inch gun was hit and knocked out and right after this two torpedoes, one from V 100 and one from G 103, impacted at PARTRIDGE amidships. Her commanding officer, lieutenant-commander H.R. Ransome, gave in this desperate situation order to leave ship and to do everything possible to speed up her sinking. Meanwhile V 100 and G 103 came very close to the sinking PARTRIDGE. The lieutenants Grey and Walter manned the aft torpedo set and released one torpedo towards V 100, which hit, but did not explode. At least Grey got rescued by the crew of V 100 and he made a lifelong friend in one of his rescuers, which was the late Vice-Admiral Ruge of the Bundesmarine, one of the most influential officers of the German navy post war.
PARTRIDGE sank right after this and V 100 was given the order to take up survivors.  G 103 followed two armed trawlers which were trying to escape in a southeastern direction subsequently sinking them. G 101 meanwhile followed the PELLEW, which soon was coming out of sight in a rain squall. The Germans thought, they couldn t overcome her speed. In fact, PELLEW, just before getting into the rain and out of sight, had suffered a heavy engine room hit and was loosing steam. The British destroyer fired a torpedo against the Germans, which G 103 could evade only in the last second. PELLEW would reach Norway with the port turbine set destroyed.
Now the whole convoy including the armed trawlers and the English armed merchant ship “Cordova” (2,284 GRT) got sunk. Within 1 hour and 13 minutes after sighting the convoy and its covering force were wiped out. Of the PARTRIDGE and the armed trawlers the Germans saved 4 officers and 48 crew, of the crews of the steamers 23. The loss of the Germans were 1 dead, 3 wounded.
While this happened, the Germans were unaware, that not only Captain Molteno´s battle group, made out of SHANNON, MINOTAUR and 4 destroyers were in the region, but also Captain Woolcombes 3rd light cruiser squadron with the fast light cruisers HMS CHATHAM, HMS BIRKENHEAD and HMS YARMOUTH as well as 4 other destroyers.
Molteno´s battle group, who had received the radio message of PARTRIDGE, sent their destroyers at high speed to the battle scene, the armored cruisers following with 20 knots.
Meanwhile, the commanding officer of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Beatty, was notified of the action and he had 5th battle Squadron, all battle cruisers and the 2nd and 4th light cruiser squadron raising steam. He also ordered Woolcombe´s cruiser squadron to make to the battleground as fast as possible. To no avail. The German forces (the other half flotilla had sunk four merchants at the coast of England) reunited on the Doggerbank and steamed back through the Skagerrak and Kattegatt, entering Kiel in the Baltic sea unharmed the other day.
Captain Molteno´s destroyers entered the battle scene at 15.00. They could rescue the remaining crews out of the water. With PARTRIDGE 5 officers and 92 crewmen drowned, PELLEW lost 3 dead and several wounded.
Woolcombe´s force, as it proved after the war, missed the German half flotilla only narrowly.

AFTERMATH
In eradicating a whole convoy the 2nd time in two months the Germans scored a complete, albeit minor, victory.
The British altered their convoy system to Norway. Instead of daily convoys there were only 3 convoys per week with a much stronger covering force. A distant covering force was also fielded, which was made out of a battle squadron with 5-6 dreadnoughts and destroyers.
The large mine barrage, the Allies installed between the Orkneys and Norway was not a consequence of this. The mines were laid deep, they were only installed to fight u-boats and surface ships were not in danger.
The German force did another raid in the channel in 1918. The formidable boats of 3rd half flotilla had theirselves scuttled at Scapa Flow in 1919 on behalf of Admiral Reuters order. Only the turbine sets of V 100 survived, being reused in the French destroyer AVENTURIER.
Tactically the action underlined a new trend. Before WW I leading naval officers headed for a decisive action against an opponent using line of battle tactics, as was done off the Yalu 1894, Santiago and Manila 1898, Yellow Sea 1904 and Tsushima 1905. These tactics disappeared after Jutland and this was one of the proofs. Decisive action in WW II would only happen between carrier task forces. Line of battle tactics were only deployed in fending off the opponent, who tried to do the hit-and-run, and these never were decisive actions.

Sources:
Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918, Band 7, (kritische Edition).
Conway´s all the world fighting ships 1906-1921
Groener: Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945, volume 2
among others

@Bodrog: Selbst schreiben oder was halten...
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #16 am: 25 Januar 2017, 15:10:07 »
Oh, ich merke gerade: Falsche Schlacht! Hier geht es um das Anschlussgefecht.
Das muss dem Bernd jetzt wieder ganz schön Spaß machen....
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline kalli

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #17 am: 25 Januar 2017, 15:17:04 »
Oh, ich merke gerade: Falsche Schlacht! Hier geht es um das Anschlussgefecht.

Kann passieren. Willst Du vielleicht einen gesonderten Thread damit aufmachen? In deutscher Sprache?

Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #18 am: 25 Januar 2017, 15:37:08 »
Ach was, Kalli. Geschenkt. Es wurde nur in Frage gestellt, dass ich Marinegeschichte kenne und in Frage gestellt, ob ich sie darstellen kann. Das geht auf jeden Fall "light". Denke ich mal. So, dass man es lesen kann. Hab das für einen Thread von einem englischen Freund gemacht.

Und die Flandern-Sperre-Schlacht lese ich mir dann beim Großmeister durch...
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline kalli

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #19 am: 25 Januar 2017, 15:47:51 »
Es wurde nur in Frage gestellt, dass ich Marinegeschichte kenne und in Frage gestellt, ob ich sie darstellen kann.

Ach so, verletzter Stolz :-D

Offline beck.Schulte

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #20 am: 25 Januar 2017, 16:36:09 »
Lieber Herr Ebermann!
Guck ma „ Das geht auf jeden Fall „light“. „  Recht so und das unterscheidet uns zwei beide. Was du da abgeliefert hast, ist a la „Wiki“. Keine britische oder deutsche Primärquelle. Dabei kommt man heute doch einfach an die Sachen heran.  Wohlgemerkt, das „kritische“ beim KzS Band 7 bezieht sich keineswegs auf den Text der Einzelunternehmungen, sondern betr. das ausklammern der Vorgänge in Nov. 1918. Hast du überhaupt was hinterfragt oder nur abgeschrieben ?  Wo liegt deine Eigenleistung , außer fleißig auf die Tasten zu hauen. ?
Das wäre mir mit der Distanz von 100 Jahren einfach zu wenig. KzS ist eine Selbstdarstellung ( Auf See unbesiegt). Gleiches gilt für die amtlichen Darstellung aus GB, FR usw. Wer damit zufrieden ist, ohne Tiefgang und ohne kritische Quellenprüfung , der ist bei dir gut aufgehoben. „Badewannenliteratur“ muß auch sein 
Allein schon das da …..the German destroyers of 2nd flotilla were the only ones the Germans themselves would name destroyers (“Zerstörer”) instead of “Torpedoboote”... zeigt deine Unkenntnis betr. der Kaiserlichen Marine. Na ja, wie du schon geschrieben hast, du gibt die „Light“ Version ab. Nix für ungut und dat war`s von hier. Auf mich wartet jetzt ein Kaffee und ein Spagetti Eis. 8-)

Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #21 am: 25 Januar 2017, 16:48:02 »
Lieber Herr Langensiepen,

Rentner haben Zeit. ich nicht. Schon mal drüber nach gedacht.

Abgesehen davon, dass ich die falsche Schlacht relativ treffend dargestellt haben dürfte, habe ich das schon vor geraumer Zeit verfasst und einfach keine Zeit mehr, obwohl ich örtlich viel näher an der Kwelle sitze als Ihr Frührentner mit Alleinanspruch auf die Wahrheit.

Ich finde es trotzdem gut, von Dir zu lesen. Das schaue ich mir hier öfter jetzt an. Nur wegen Dir  :MLL:
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline beck.Schulte

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #22 am: 25 Januar 2017, 16:57:03 »
Ich wollte eigentlich nix mehr dazu sagen, aber "Rentner haben Zeit. ich nicht. Schon mal drüber nach gedachtt.".. Ist milde gesagt dummes Zeug. Die meisten der Autoren des MNB sind berufstätig oft mit Familie anne Backe. Auch diese Leute forschen. Ich veröffentliche seit ca. 1970 , glaube mich zu erinnern, dass ich bis 2009 Vollzeit beschäftigt war und danach bis zum Umzug nach BHV noch teilzeitig auf Tankern und Tanklagern rum gekrabbelt bin. Also bitte Herr Ebermann.  8-)

Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #23 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:01:53 »
@14, Kalli: Nö.

Man kann eine Geschichte erzählen. Dazu verschiedene Quellen benutzen. Habe ich gemacht. Wurde hier bestritten. Ist aber so. Mein Gott, ich will doch keine Doktorarbeit abliefern. Ich finde es aber im Gegenzug bestreitbar, wenn ähhh "Wissenschaftler" "Primärquellen" auswerten wollen und dann eine Meinungshoheit für sich beanspruchen. Die Wissenschaft geht noch weiter als die Primärquelle. Was hat sich der jeweilige historische Berichterstatter gedacht? Wenn man da anfängt, kommt man der Wahrheit sicher näher.

Ansonsten reicht "light", Professor Langensiepen.
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline Urs Heßling

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #24 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:12:08 »
moin,

[Marinegeschichte]  .. ob ich sie darstellen kann. Das geht auf jeden Fall "light". Denke ich mal.
Da bin ich - wie Bernd - entschieden anderer Meinung

Was du da abgeliefert hast, ist a la „Wiki“.
Nee, Bernd, das ist schon einen ganzen Schlag mehr, und es gefällt mir, abgesehen von einigen englischen "misses" wie capitulation statt surrender, nicht schlecht top

Auf mich wartet jetzt ein Kaffee und ein Spagetti Eis. 8-)
Da ja (D)ein Schreibfehler der Auslöser des Hickhacks war, .. bitte ich zu beachten : Spaghetti  :-D :-D

Rentner haben Zeit. ich nicht. Schon mal drüber nach gedacht.
Ekke, wenn Du hier schon eine solche Darstellung einstellst, darf das kein Argument für eine möglicherweise (!) mindere Qualität sein.

Gruß, Urs



« Letzte Änderung: 25 Januar 2017, 17:23:25 von Urs Heßling »
"History will tell lies, Sir, as usual" - General "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne zu seiner Niederlage bei Saratoga 1777 im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg - nicht in Wirklichkeit, aber in George Bernard Shaw`s Bühnenstück "The Devil`s Disciple"

Offline halina

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #25 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:25:01 »
Moin , weiß im Moment zwar nicht ob ich noch im obengenannten Thread gelandet bin , möchte nur
noch kurz anmerken , dass der Gefechtsverlauf zum Nachteil für die deutschen T-Boote auch durch
den frühen Ausfall von V 69 mit dem Tod des Flotillenführers Max Schultz entstanden ist , zum Glück
gab es keinen eigenen Bootsverlust , so dass  in Bezug auf die grosse Überlegenheit der britischen Streitkräfte das Gefecht im Vergleich der beiderseitigen Verluste der deutschen Seite doch ein kleiner
Erfolg zugestanden werden kann .
                                                                                                                                  :MG:   halina

Der folgende Link von WIKI zeigt einige Passagen des Gefechtes in einer Kurzfassung :

                            https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_S_50_(1915)
" Man muss nicht unbedingt das Licht des Anderen ausblasen , um das eigene Licht leuchten
zu lassen"
                      Phil Borman

Offline Leutnant Werner

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #26 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:53:10 »
Habe mich vertan, Halina, deswegen ist gerade der Schwerpunkt der Diskussion ...öhhh...ein wenig verlagert worden. Bitte um Nachsicht.
"Ach, der Schampus....wie unaufmerksam von mir!" (Günther Lamprecht als Kapitän des Versorgers "Vegesack" in "Das Boot")

Offline Urs Heßling

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #27 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:54:40 »
moin, Ekke,

wer etwas schreibt, muß auch Kritik ertragen (können). Also :

Only in 1915 the lesson was learned by the loss of several small cruisers and torpedoboat “destroyers” by lack of firepower.
"Several small cruisers and torpedo boats" ?  .. für das Jahr 1915 fällt mir da nur V 99 ein.
Die Dresden hätte - abgesehen davon, daß sie sich nicht verteidigte, auch mit 15 cm-Geschützen keine Chance gegen drei Briten gehabt, .. und zuvor (1914) .. eigentlich auch nur die Emden.
In allen anderen Gefechten von 1914/1915, z.B. Helgoland, sehe ich keine bessere Chance mit einer (etwas) stärkeren Bewaffnung.


[SMS G 101, SMS G103 and SMS G 104 ] .. They featured a short and high forecastle, two masts, three smokestacks and had two twin torpedo tube sets as main armament.
Die Boote hatten zwei Doppelrohrsätze und zwei Einzelrohre weiter vorn, insgesamt 6


Convoys reduced the number of undefended ships to be sunk by u-boats to near nil,
"to near nil" - Das ist zumindest diskussionwürdig


Meanwhile the two british destroyers had made themselves battle ready,
.. had gone to "action stations"


Decisive action in WW II would only happen between carrier task forces. Line of battle tactics were only deployed in fending off the opponent, who tried to do the hit-and-run, and these never were decisive actions.
ein Gegenbeispiel : Schlacht in der Surigaostraße 24./25.10.1944

Aber dennoch : well done.

Gruß, Urs
"History will tell lies, Sir, as usual" - General "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne zu seiner Niederlage bei Saratoga 1777 im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg - nicht in Wirklichkeit, aber in George Bernard Shaw`s Bühnenstück "The Devil`s Disciple"

Offline halina

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #28 am: 25 Januar 2017, 17:57:11 »
Moin Leutnant Werner ,

Ist schon in Ordnung , kein Problem von meiner Seite ,                                      Gruss  halina
" Man muss nicht unbedingt das Licht des Anderen ausblasen , um das eigene Licht leuchten
zu lassen"
                      Phil Borman

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Re: Seegefecht in der südlichen Nordsee im Januar 1917
« Antwort #29 am: 25 Januar 2017, 18:02:17 »
auch durch den frühen Ausfall von V 69 mit dem Tod des Flotillenführers Max Schultz entstanden ist Wie kommen Sie denn darauf?  Das ging alles recht schnell ab und da hatte jeder mit sich selbst genug zu tun. Die sind doch nicht a la Skagerrak nett hinter einander hergefahren. Da herrschte Wuling in winterlicher Dunkelheit. Wie sollte da wer eine Flottille führen? Mal aufmerksam die Gefechtsberichte lesen. Aber wer stellt schon Wiki in Frage.
PS: Danke Herr Ebermann für den "Professor". Das tat nun nicht nötig. Ist zu viel der Ehre.  8-)

Urs: ich schreib jetzt 100 mal  "Spagetti Eis mit ohne Sahne extra".  :-D
« Letzte Änderung: 25 Januar 2017, 18:20:33 von beck.Schulte »