E.-Santo
28.July - das erste Flugfeld war für Jäger einsatzbereit.
Ca. 28.August für B-17.
vorherige B-17 Einsatzbasen waren auf Neu Kaledonien
Noumea
Plaine Des Gaiacs
Ende Juli Bestand und Verteilung von Flugzeugen
Efate
18 Jäger, 6 Aufklärer, 16 B-17
New Caledonia
38 P-400 / P-39, 16 F4F, 27 B-17, 10 B-26, 22 PBY, 6 Hudson (RNZAF)
Tontouta
24 Jäger, 6 Aufklärer
auf den Fijis
17 Jäger, 9 PBY, 8 B-17, 12 B-26, 24 RNZAF-Bomber und -Aufklärer (meist veraltete Typen)
Samoa 18 Jäger, 10 Aufklärer, 17 Aufklärer/Bomber
Beute auf Guadalcanal
34 LKW
4 Traktoren
3 Benzinangetriebene Zementmischer
6 Benzinangetriebene Walzen
567.000 Liter - 65 Oktan Benzin
600 to Zement
80 to Betonstahl
Baustahl
Dynamit
Schaufeln
Schubkarren
Gras-Matte Taschen.
(Quelle: 13th Fighter Command in World War II)
Auszüge aus
"13th Fighter Command in World War II
Air Combat over Guadalcanal and the Solomons"
von William Wolf
"...
Once completed, there were two runway conditions on henderson, dry dust that contaminated engines and made visibility nil, or a quagmire that made take offs and landings harrowing. after five weeks henderson remained unusable by medium and heavy bombers, and except for the small detachment of 67FS fighters no AAF unit would be based on cactus until dezember. steel matting was not scheduled to be laid until 25 september and would make the field more operational, but once down it would become sharpnel when hit by japanese boms and shells.
...
Finally, on the afternoon of the 20th, the escort carrier Long Island, laying 200-miles out, launched 12 Marine SBD Dauntless
dive-bombers ofRichardMangrum's VMSB-232 "Red Devils" and 19 F4F-4 fighters of John Smith's VMF-223 of the advanced squad-
rons of Marine Air Group (MAG) 23.
...
While on New Caledonia 27 P-400s were fitted with belly tanks for the long flight to Guadalcanal. After several long-legged plan-
ning flights around New Caledonia Capt. Dale Brannon was able to estimate flying time, fuel consumption, and engine cruise control
settings for a flight to Guadalcanal. Gen. Harmon had planned to transfer three flights of five P-400s each, navigated by a B-17, to
Cactus. However, that would leave New Caledonia defense with only 12 P-400s, two P-39s, and two P-43s, so Harmon modified his
plans. Two flights were to be sent, the first with five aircraft and the second with nine later. At 1000 on 21 August, five P-400s piloted
by Brannon, and Lts. Davis, Erwin, Brzuska, and Fincher, took off from Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, joined their B-17 escort,
and flew 325 miles to Efate in two hours 20 minutes. Then, after a brief stop there flew 180 miles to Espiritu Santo. The next morning
their fuel tanks had to be topped off after warm up, as every ounce of fuel would be critical for the final leg to Cactus. They left Espiritu
equipped with belly tanks and flew 640 miles to Henderson at 200 feet led by a B-17 navigating above, and followed by another B-17
equipped with rubber rafts to be dropped to any ditching pilots. The flight was flown through intermittent low stratus clouds and mist,
and the pilots were happy to have the B-17 mother hen. All five fighters landed safely at Henderson at 1030, 3:45 later, to come
under the command of MAG-23 of the 1st Marine Air Wing. The next day Lt. Robert Chilson, with 30 enlisted men of the ground
echelon, arrived at Lunga on the transport Fomalhaute that left Noumea on the 17th. The 67th was ready for operations, but the conditions at
Henderson were abysmal at best. It was a frontline base in every sense of the word. Once the two flights of 15 pilots, 30 ground
crew, and 15 P-400s arrived they were assigned to the Marines and relied on the Leathernecks for food, supplies, quarters, and medical
care. The ground crew was quartered in an abandoned Japanese hangar at the west end of the field that was close to their aircraft
and bomb shelters. Brannon and his pilots were billeted in mudfloored, unscreened tents located between the ocean and airfield in
the Lever Brothers Company coconut plantation, which was often flooded and referred to as the "Mosquito Grove." It was said that
the mosquitoes on Cactus were so large that one landed at Henderson and was refueled and rearmed by a ground crew before being iden-
tified!
...
Aircraft servicing facilities were non-existent, and ground crews had to work 14 to 16 hour days with rudimentary equipment and insufficienr tools to maintain the aircraft, leaving them little time to improve theirliving conditions. Operations on Guadalcanal were dependent on naval transport to bring in fuel and heavy equipment to improve the field. Fueling was a backbreaking task, as fuel had to be hand-pumped out of 55-gallon drums, strained through chamois into 12-quart buckets, and then poured into the aircraft fuel tanks.
The bomb supply was adequate, but there were no bomb hoists to move and load them. There were too few ground crews, armorers,and mechanics, and there were few tools, spare parts, and block
and tackle equipment. Only seven armorers were sent to service the first 14 fighters.
Guadalcanal weather was typically tropical, with high altitude clouds building up by mid-afternoon and thunder storms occurring
by late afternoon and early evening. The storms usually occurred closer to land than out to sea and were locally heavy, but aircraft
could generally fly around them. Often the missions sent aircraft to the limits of their fuel, and an unexpected weather front or storm
could be deadly, as could navigational errors. The reaction to being caught in bad weather was for the pilot to drop below the clouds
and to try to get some visual fix. But flying blind at low altitude could lead to hitting the highlands of a mountain, or even the ocean
itself. The advantage of navigation up or down the Slot was that the two chains of islands that made up the Solomons generally ran along
the north and south of it toward Guadalcanal, and a pilot could navigate between them. The South Pacific skies were extremely clear and often made up for poor navigation. Against regulations
Cactus air controllers would often turn on radio beacons, radio silence was neglected, and for late arriving flights in darkness the
searchlights were turned on. There were usually clouds nearby, and this allowed outclassed fighter and vulnerable dive-bombers a place
to run and hide. American aircraft were exceptionally sturdy, and pilots regularly flew through bad weather without the fear of struc-
tural damage. Probably as many American losses were due to operational causes as to the Japanese. The sudden torrential equato-
rial rains were dried to dust by the first three hours of scorching sun the next day. The extent and location of mud and dust depended on drainage. Dust and mud caused a maintenance crisis, as aircraft
engines and instruments were complex and unable to cope with the elements sucked into them via aircraft cooling systems on taxiing,
takeoff, and landing. It was the nature of the Pacific air war that the air forces would fly from the worst fields, as they were recently captured and closest to the battle.
...
...
By this time the Japanese South Pacific strategy was formulated. Their bases on Bougainville, Vella Lavella on Kula Gulf, and
Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel were readilysupplied from Rabaul and Truk. Men and supplies were loaded onto destroyer/transports and
sometimes cruisers from these bases, and made up the "Tokyo Express." The ships hid in the central Solomons in the daytime from
searchingAllied aircraft from Cactus, and then passed quickly down the Slot at night, landing troops and supplies near Henderson, and
concluded their mission by lobbing a few shells on the field. By daylight the Tokyo Express had returned safely to the central
Solomons.
...
...
Henderson had received 31 new aircraft by I September, but the Japanese received 36 fighters and 27 bombers that day. Both Harmon and Ghormley had repeatedly requested that Gen. Arnold send the Lockheed P-38 Lightning to the South Pacific, but the success the impending NorthAfrican invasion in early November depended on the P-38. The Lightning was the only fighter that was able to cross the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain and then fly to North Africa, so none could be spared. Adm. Ghormley had also asked MacArthur for P-38s, but MacArthur was under pressure from a
threatened Japanese invasion at Port Moresby, New Guinea. He had only 18 P-38s himself and, in turn, asked Ghormley to lend
him some of his four aircraft carriers!
...
...
The Japanese would organize air and naval attacks 11 times in September, 16 times in October, and eight times in ,ovember. The
Tokyo Express was operating nearly nightly. Beginning in August and increasing in September and. 'early October the Japanese rein-
forced Guadalcanal by sending Jast destroyer/transports and cruisers down the Slot from the Shortland Islands in the afternoon.
...
...
On 17 September air strength on Guadalcanal was 63 operational aircraft, of which 36 were recent arrivals from the Navy carriers: 29 F4Fs; 26 SBDs; 5TBFs; and 3 P-400s. Maj.Gen. Ross
Rowell, CG ofMarine Air Wings Pacific (MAWPac), commented:
"What saved Guadalcanal was the loss of so many carriers." Six more Navy TBFs arrived on the 18th, and two more SBDs and TBFs on the 28th. During the last half of September Cactus lost two or
three planes per day, mostly through weather and accidents, as Japanese attacks were diminished during that fortnight. The loss rate for Marine VMFs for the first 25 days of the Guadalcanal cam-
paign was 57%, which could not be sustained. On 17 September Navy COMINCH Adm. Ernest King sent a memo to Army Chief of
Staff, Gen. George Marshall. The memo stated that the grave situation at Guadalcanal:
"...made it imperative that the future continuous flow of army fighters be planned at once, irrespective of, and in higher priority than the commitments to any other theater" (e.g. "Europe first" - author).
Marshall answered King, saying that Nimitz had the authority to move aircraft in the Pacific and "higher authorities" had assigned TORCH (the invasion of North Africa) the highest priority. The rift between the Army and Navy was widening, and Arnold made a brief visit to the Pacific in late September. He met with Harmon, who gave him a very gloomy report on the meager supplies reach-
ing Guadalcanal and the steady stream of Japanese troops and aircraft moving into the upper Solomons in preparation for a large offensive on Guadalcanal. Arnold maintained that the base facili-
ties in the South Pacific were insufficient to handle anything but what had been allocated to them, and the main problem was one of distribution of aircraft and personnel from Hawaii, which he con-
sidered a vast base of supply. As the debate escalated Marshall realized that the entire outcome in the South Pacific depended on the Guadalcanal result. Marshall authorized 27 medium bombers and
133 fighters for the Pacific, with 23 heavy bombers to fly in and 53 additional fighters to be shipped in by water. At the time there were 1,014 air personnel at Cactus: 917 Marine; 64 Navy; and 33 Air
Force. Cactus ground forces were also reinforced, as on 18 September a large U.S. Navy convoy debarked in the early morning and embarked before 1800, when the Japanese Navy usually came
down the Slot. TheMarine garrison was reinforced with 4,262 troops of the fresh 7th Marine Division, along with food and gasoline. The reinforcements allowed Vandegrift to consolidate his defensive pe-
rimeter and consider a minor expansion.
...
...
During the night of 3/4 October the destroyers of the Tokyo Express were reinforced by the seaplane tender Nisshin, whose size allowed it to land a large number of troops and artillery pieces. The P-400s and SBDs had only limited success against the Express, as it would not come into range until the late afternoon, and poor weather and darkness interfered with missions sent against it. Once landed these troops and equipment, and new storage buildings became targets for the P-400s. The PAOOs and SBDs were not the only aircraft to attack the Japanese in the area. In August and September B-17s of the IIBG flew 299 search missions and 151 bombing missions against Japanese air bases, supply centers, and shipping. By October there were 50 B-17s available in the South Pacific.
...
...
As the situation in early October worsened Harmon made three suggestions to COMSOPAC: (I) immediate reinforcement by not
less than one infantry combat team; (2) strengthen naval forces in the area; and (3) bring in all available airdrome construction per-
sonnel and their equipment. Harmon requested the completion of two all-weather runways and dispersal areas, improved camouflage,
and airfield fueling systems and supply so that there would be a constant minimum reserve of a quarter million gallons available.
Harmon had implored Ghormley to improve Henderson so that B-17s could be based there so they would not have to fly 700 miles
from Espiritu Santo, as once based at Cactus the Flying Fortresses could begin operations against the Buin-Tonolei-Buka area to at-
tack and disrupt enemy air operations. By the beginning ofOctober the Tokyo Express had used darkness and consummate proficiency to land over 20,000 troops by
destroyer and barge. Again, destroyers carrying up to 1,000 troops each would leave the Shortlands-Faisi area during the afternoon,
and by 1800, just before sunset, it would be just out of the 200 mile range of Guadalcanal dive-bombers. Cactus sent out some very
unsuccessful SBD night attacks, losing several planes in the darkness.
...
...
Battle of Cape Esperance, 11/12 October 1942
The naval task force under R.Adm. Norman Scott had protected the convoy that brought in the 164th Infantry, and afterward were
assigned to disrupt Japanese supply and reinforcements coming down from Rabaul and the northern Solomons (e.g. Tokyo Express).
...
At 1345 Henderson SBD search planes and B-17s from Espiritu Santo reported two cruisers (actually the seaplane tenders) and six de-
stroyers steaming down the Slot. The afternoon air attacks on Henderson prevented further air recon on the Japanese force, and
the Nisshen-Chitose Force was undetected and unloaded its troops, heavy artillery, and supplies and escaped safely back up the Slot.
...
...
